eSIM RSP Knowledge Base

Comprehensive technical knowledge base covering 12 GSMA eSIM specifications. 84+ articles on Remote SIM Provisioning — SGP.02, SGP.22, SGP.32, SGP.41, SGP.29, SGP.23, SGP.25, SGP.26 and more.


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Privacy and Secrets: Keeping Your Chip Name Safe 🕵️🔐

Imagine…

Your house has a street address. The mail carrier needs it to deliver packages. But the address doesn’t reveal who lives inside, what they’re eating for dinner, or what’s in the packages. It’s just a location label: nothing more.

The EID works the same way. It tells the eSIM ecosystem which chip to talk to, but it doesn’t reveal anything about who you are or what you’re doing. SGP.29 builds strong privacy walls to keep it that way.


What the EID Reveals (and What It Doesn’t) 🎭

EID DOES reveal:                    EID does NOT reveal:
┌──────────────────────┐            ┌──────────────────────┐
│ • Chip manufacturer  │            │ • Your name          │
│ • Chip generation    │            │ • Your phone number  │
│ • Manufacturing batch│            │ • Your carrier       │
│ • Delegation chain   │            │ • Your location      │
│   (who authorised it)│            │ • Active profiles    │
└──────────────────────┘            │ • Device model       │
                                    │ • Who you are        │
                                    └──────────────────────┘

The EID identifies hardware, not people. This separation is enforced by two key rules:


Tracking Risks: Should You Worry? 📊

Because the EID is permanent (it survives resets, profile changes, and even factory wipes), there are theoretical tracking risks. Here’s the honest assessment:

Risk How Bad Is It? What Stops It
Cross-profile tracking Medium SM-DS access requires authentication: random people can’t just look up EIDs
Supply chain snooping Low The ERHI chain shows the manufacturer, not the end user
Device fingerprinting Low EID doesn’t say if it’s a phone, car, or smart meter
Impersonation High: but blocked! Cryptographic authentication (SGP.22) means knowing an EID isn’t enough to fake a chip’s identity

The golden rule: The EID is a claim (“I am chip #12345…”), not proof. The actual proof comes from the chip’s private key: a secret cryptographic code that never leaves the chip. An attacker who knows your EID still can’t impersonate your chip without also stealing its private key (which is locked in tamper-proof hardware).


How the GSMA Keeps the System Honest 🏛️

The GSMA’s governance isn’t just bureaucracy: it’s the enforcement backbone of EID security:

1. 🔒 Central Registry

Every ERHI1 ever assigned lives in one master list. No duplicates. No gaps. Complete audit trail.

2. ✅ Applicant Verification (≤5 days)

Before giving out any numbers, the GSMA checks: is this a real company? Do they meet all the rules? If verification raises fraud concerns, the GSMA can escalate to relevant authorities.

3. 📋 Yearly Integrity Review

Collect → Analyse → Report → Act
   │          │         │       │
   │          │         │       └─ Fix problems
   │          │         └─ Present to GSMA oversight group
   │          └─ Check for anomalies, underuse, violations
   └─ Gather usage data from all number holders

This yearly cycle catches problems before they become crises.

4. 🚫 No Recycling

Once an ERHI1 is cancelled, it’s gone forever. Never reassigned. This prevents “EID resurrection attacks” where a cancelled range is given to a new company who accidentally clashes with old chips still in the field.


The EID Lifecycle 🔄

Every EID range follows a carefully managed lifecycle:

ASSIGNMENT ──▶ ACTIVE USE ──▶ CANCELLATION ──▶ EXPIRED (archived forever)
     │              │                │                    │
     │              │                │                    │
 GSMA verifies  EUM stamps      Holder requests      Never, ever
 ≤5 days        ESINs onto      cancellation;        reassigned
 authenticity   real chips      GSMA verifies
                                and cancels

Once a range reaches “Expired,” it’s permanently archived. Those numbers will never appear on a new chip: guaranteeing that every EID ever created remains unique for all time.


The “89” Firewall 🔥

SGP.29 builds in one more clever protection: GSMA-assigned EIDs never start with “89.” That prefix is reserved for old-style SIM card identifiers (ICCIDs).

89XXXXXXXX... = Old SIM card territory (ITU-T E.118 legacy)
00-88XXXX...  = GSMA SGP.29 territory
90-99XXXX...  = GSMA SGP.29 territory

No collision possible! The "89" prefix acts as a permanent wall.

This means old and new systems coexist peacefully: an eSIM chip identified under SGP.29 will never be confused with one identified under the old ICCID scheme.


The Check Digit Shield 🛡️

The MOD 97-10 check digit algorithm provides banking-grade error detection:

Error Type Detection Rate
Single digit typo (7 → 8) 100% guaranteed
Swapped digits (12 → 21) 100% guaranteed
Twin errors (11 → 22) 100% guaranteed
Other random errors ~99.0%

If anyone: a factory worker, a database, a QR code scanner: makes a single-digit mistake in an EID, the check will catch it instantly. This prevents misrouted profiles, misidentified chips, and all the chaos that would follow.


The EID is one of the few truly permanent identifiers in the digital world. Your phone number changes when you switch carriers. Your IMEI changes when you get a new phone. But the EID on an eSIM chip stays the same forever: from the factory floor to the recycling centre. That’s why SGP.29 takes its privacy and security so seriously!


Kid-friendly version of GSMA SGP.29 v1.1: EID Security, Sections 7–9, 12–14, and Annex A

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